Home / Recent Bills / A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the Department of the Treasury relating to the review of applications under the Bank Merger Act.
SENATE · SJRES 13119 CONGRESS
A joint resolution providing for congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code, of the rule submitted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of the Department of the Treasury relating to the review of applications under the Bank Merger Act.
A joint resolution goes through the same process as a bill and carries the same legal
force once signed. One exception: a joint resolution proposing a constitutional
amendment is not presented to the President — it needs a two-thirds vote in
both chambers and then ratification by three-quarters of the states.
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Summary
S.J.Res.13 is a joint resolution of the 119th Congress, one hundred nineteenth session, that disapproves a rule submitted by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) relating to 'Business Combinations Under the Bank Merger Act.' The rule, published at 89 Fed. Reg. 78207 on September 25, 2024, addresses the process and criteria for reviewing applications for bank mergers and acquisitions under the Bank Merger Act. The Bank Merger Act, enacted as part of the broader framework of federal banking regulation, requires prior approval from the appropriate federal banking agency (in this case, the OCC for national banks) before two or more banks can merge, consolidate, or acquire each other's assets. The OCC's rule sought to update and clarify the standards and procedures for such reviews, potentially altering how the agency evaluates competitive effects, financial stability, community impact, and other factors in merger proposals.
By invoking congressional disapproval under chapter 8 of title 5, United States Code (the Congressional Review Act, CRA), S.J.Res.13 aims to nullify the OCC's rule entirely. If passed by both the Senate and House of Representatives and signed by the President (or if Congress overrides a presidential veto), the rule would have no force or effect, meaning the OCC could not implement or enforce it. The CRA provides an expedited process for Congress to overturn recently finalized federal regulations, requiring only a simple majority in each chamber for passage (subject to potential filibuster in the Senate, though the CRA limits debate time). Once a rule is disapproved under the CRA, the agency is barred from issuing a substantially similar rule without future congressional authorization, unless Congress passes a new law specifically allowing it.
The specific OCC rule targeted by S.J.Res.13 likely aimed to modernize merger review guidelines, possibly incorporating considerations of technological change, fintech integration, or evolving market structures in the banking industry. Critics of the rule from the banking industry or certain political perspectives might argue it imposes unnecessary burdens, creates uncertainty, or overly restricts beneficial consolidation that could improve efficiency and service. Supporters of the rule, including consumer advocates and those concerned with financial stability, might argue it ensures thorough review of mergers that could reduce competition, lead to higher fees, worsen service in underserved areas, or increase systemic risk.
S.J.Res.13 does not propose a constitutional amendment; it is a standard joint resolution exercising congressional oversight authority under the CRA. Therefore, it follows the normal legislative process: passage by both chambers and presentation to the President for signature. If enacted, it would invalidate the OCC's merger rule, reverting to previous guidance or requiring the OCC to develop a new approach consistent with any remaining statutory directives. The resolution reflects broader debates about the appropriate level of regulatory scrutiny in bank consolidation, the balance between fostering innovation and maintaining competition, and the role of congressional oversight versus agency expertise in financial regulation.
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On passage Passed by the Yeas and Nays: 220 - 207 (Roll no. 137).
May 20, 2025
Passed/agreed to in House: On passage Passed by the Yeas and Nays: 220 - 207 (Roll no. 137).
May 20, 2025
Considered as unfinished business. (consideration: CR H2177-2178)
May 20, 2025
POSTPONED PROCEEDINGS - At the conclusion of debate on S.J. Res. 13, the Chair put the question on passage of the joint resolution and by voice vote, announced that the ayes had prevailed. Ms. Waters demanded the yeas and nays and the Chair postponed further proceedings until a time to be announced.
May 20, 2025
The previous question was ordered pursuant to the rule.
May 20, 2025
DEBATE - The House proceeded with one hour of debate on S.J. Res. 13.
May 20, 2025
Rule provides for consideration of S.J. Res. 13 and S.J. Res. 31. The resolution provides for consideration of S.J. Res. 13 and S.J. Res. 31 under a closed rule with one hour of general debate on each joint resolution. The resolution also provides for a motion to commit on both joint resolutions.
May 20, 2025
Considered under the provisions of rule H. Res. 426. (consideration: CR H2168-2175)
May 19, 2025
Rules Committee Resolution H. Res. 426 Reported to House. Rule provides for consideration of S.J. Res. 13 and S.J. Res. 31. The resolution provides for consideration of S.J. Res. 13 and S.J. Res. 31 under a closed rule with one hour of general debate on each joint resolution. The resolution also provides for a motion to commit on both joint resolutions.