Home  /  Recent Bills  /  Protect Our Seniors Act
SENATE · S 36 119 CONGRESS

Protect Our Seniors Act

INTRODUCED
January 08, 2025
POLICY AREA
Social Welfare
STATUS
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
SOURCE
Congress.gov ↗

Bill Summary

The Protect Our Seniors Act (S. 36), introduced by Sen. Rick Scott, proposes two new Senate budget enforcement rules meant to insulate Social Security and Medicare from cuts and from being used as “piggy banks” to finance unrelated policies. The bill does not change program benefits directly; instead, it amends the Congressional Budget Act to create points of order that make it procedurally very difficult for the Senate to pass legislation that reduces benefits or diverts Medicare savings to other purposes. Both points of order can only be waived by a two‑thirds vote of Senators—67 votes if all seats are filled—which is an unusually high threshold that would give these protections significant force in practice.

First, the bill establishes a “Medicare and Social Security Point of Order” prohibiting Senate consideration of any bill, amendment, motion, or conference report that would reduce benefits under Medicare (Title XVIII of the Social Security Act) or reduce benefits payable under Social Security’s Title II (retirement, survivors, and disability insurance). The text focuses on “benefits,” not program outlays in general. That distinction matters: it targets changes that diminish what beneficiaries receive or can claim. Examples that would likely be covered include raising the Social Security full retirement age, reducing cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs), altering the benefit formula in a way that lowers earned benefits, imposing means-testing that reduces benefits for some beneficiaries, or raising the Medicare eligibility age. Provider payment cuts, fraud-and-abuse savings, or administrative changes that reduce Medicare spending without reducing the defined benefits might not be captured by this first point of order. To move any measure that does reduce benefits would require the two‑thirds waiver vote.

Second, the bill creates a separate “Medicare Point of Order” aimed at budgeting practices. It bars Senate consideration of any measure whose scored budgetary effects “use a decrease in outlays, or an increase in revenue, under the [Medicare] programs to offset a cost of a provision of the measure that is not for the purpose of carrying out those programs.” In plain terms, if a bill generates savings within Medicare (for instance, by reducing overpayments to plans or providers, or by drug cost reforms) or raises Medicare-related revenues, those savings cannot be used to pay for unrelated spending or tax cuts elsewhere in the bill. They must stay devoted to Medicare purposes—such as strengthening the Medicare trust fund, enhancing Medicare benefits, or paying for other Medicare operations. This point of order, too, requires a two‑thirds vote to waive, and sustaining the chair’s ruling on an appeal also requires two‑thirds.

Taken together, these provisions are designed to accomplish two goals: prevent direct benefit cuts to seniors’ core federal programs, and create a “lockbox” effect so that when lawmakers find savings in Medicare, those savings are not repurposed for non-Medicare priorities. The bill applies only to Senate procedure; the House is not bound by these points of order. Nevertheless, because most major legislation must pass both chambers, a Senate rule of this kind would significantly shape what can be enacted.

Operationally, enforcement would depend on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring and the Senate parliamentarian’s interpretation. For the first point of order, the core question would be whether a provision reduces benefits under Title II (Social Security) or Medicare. For the second, CBO would identify whether the bill’s overall budgetary effects rely on Medicare savings or revenue increases to finance costs in other, non-Medicare parts of the bill. This could affect large packages that combine Medicare reforms with broader health or fiscal changes; even if the overall package reduces the deficit, the rule would likely still apply if Medicare savings are offsetting costs elsewhere in the bill.

The implications are substantial for future budget deals and reconciliation bills. Reconciliation often includes changes to entitlement programs and offsets that allow a package to meet budget targets. Under S. 36, inserting any benefit-reducing entitlement reforms for Social Security or Medicare would face a 67‑vote hurdle, even in reconciliation. Similarly, using Medicare pay‑fors—like cuts to overpayments, site-neutral payment reforms, or pharmaceutical savings—to fund unrelated spending or tax changes would be procedurally blocked unless two‑thirds of Senators agreed to waive the rule. Lawmakers could still enact Medicare savings, but those savings would have to be dedicated to Medicare itself (for example, to extend the Hospital Insurance trust fund or add new Medicare benefits such as dental or vision) or left to reduce deficits without being paired with unrelated new costs.

The bill leaves wide latitude for non-benefit-side solvency measures for Social Security—such as increasing payroll tax rates or raising the taxable wage cap—since the restriction is on cutting benefits, not increasing revenue. For Medicare, it preserves the ability to pursue efficiencies and savings so long as they are not used to offset other policy costs outside Medicare. The language “for the purpose of carrying out those programs” will require case-by-case interpretation; drafters may attempt to characterize certain health initiatives as Medicare-related to avoid the point of order, and the parliamentarian would referee those claims.

Politically, S. 36 positions its sponsor and supporters as defenders of seniors, while also reviving a long-running “trust fund lockbox” idea that both parties have embraced at times. Supporters will see it as a guardrail against benefit cuts and against using Medicare as a pay‑for for unrelated agendas. Critics will argue it constrains comprehensive fiscal negotiations and makes difficult but potentially necessary entitlement reforms even harder by requiring a supermajority. The bill does not change benefit law directly, but by changing the procedural landscape in the Senate, it would meaningfully shape what kinds of Social Security and Medicare legislation can realistically move forward.

Ask This Bill

Ask a specific question about this bill’s actual text — answers cite the section they come from.

Read the full analysis on Congress.gov →

Where Each Party Stands

Democrats

MIGHT SUPPORT
+Creates a high procedural barrier (two‑thirds vote) against cutting Social Security and Medicare benefits, aligning with the party’s long-standing commitment to protect earned benefits for seniors and people with disabilities.
+Prevents the use of Medicare savings to fund unrelated spending or tax cuts, closing a common “pay‑for” tactic and encouraging reinvestment of savings into Medicare’s solvency and benefits.
+Reduces the risk of benefit reductions slipping through large budget or reconciliation packages, where protections can otherwise be weaker.
+Supports program integrity by keeping Medicare-focused reforms and savings within Medicare, potentially extending the Hospital Insurance trust fund.
+Provides a clear political and policy signal that benefit erosion—via COLA changes, eligibility age hikes, or formula cuts—should not proceed without overwhelming bipartisan consensus.
MIGHT OPPOSE
Limits fiscal flexibility for progressive health expansions outside Medicare (e.g., Affordable Care Act subsidies or public health investments) that have historically been financed in part with Medicare savings.
Could complicate comprehensive health reform packages that combine Medicare efficiencies with broader coverage initiatives by triggering a two‑thirds hurdle.
May constrain progressive redesigns that pair benefit expansions for lower-income beneficiaries with targeted reductions for higher-income beneficiaries (means-testing), since any reduction in benefits would face the supermajority requirement.
Ambiguities around what counts as “for the purpose of carrying out” Medicare could lead to restrictive interpretations that block worthwhile, Medicare-adjacent health investments.
Locks in a Senate-only rule, creating procedural asymmetry and potential friction with the House during conference negotiations.

Republicans

MIGHT SUPPORT
+Signals a strong commitment to seniors by protecting Medicare and Social Security benefits, countering accusations that Republicans favor entitlement cuts.
+Establishes a “Medicare lockbox,” preventing lawmakers from using Medicare savings to subsidize unrelated spending or tax measures—a message of fiscal discipline within the program.
+Encourages that any efficiencies or savings in Medicare are reinvested to strengthen Medicare’s trust fund or enhance benefits, rather than diverted.
+Creates a high bar that prevents rushed or partisan benefit cuts from moving through reconciliation or end-of-year budget packages.
+Political upside: provides members a clear procedural tool to demonstrate pro-senior credentials and resist benefit-cut amendments.
MIGHT OPPOSE
Constrains entitlement reform options that many fiscal conservatives view as necessary to address long-term debt, by imposing a 67-vote threshold on any Medicare or Social Security benefit reductions.
Prevents using Medicare savings as offsets for other priorities, including deficit-neutral tax reforms or broader health system changes favored by some Republicans.
Shifts the path to Social Security solvency toward revenue-side options (e.g., tax increases) or general deficit reduction, since benefit-side adjustments become procedurally daunting.
Invites procedural skirmishes and parliamentarian rulings that could complicate GOP-crafted omnibus or reconciliation packages that mix Medicare reforms with other policies.
Because it is a Senate-only restriction embedded in statute, it could constrain negotiations with a Republican-led House seeking broader offsets, reducing deal-making flexibility.

History

Jan 08, 2025
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
Jan 08, 2025
Introduced in Senate
SPONSOR
Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]
Sen. Scott, Rick [R-FL]
FL · R
SUBJECTS
Legislative rules and procedure Medicare Senate Social security and elderly assistance