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SENATE · S 30 119 CONGRESS

ERASER Act

INTRODUCED
January 08, 2025
POLICY AREA
Government Operations and Politics
STATUS
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
SOURCE
Congress.gov ↗

Bill Summary

The ERASER Act (S. 30) is a statutory “regulatory budget” proposal that would require federal agencies to eliminate three existing regulations for every new regulation they issue. It adopts and tightens the spirit of the former 2017 “two-for-one” executive order by making it law and by adding a cost discipline for major rules. The bill’s premise is to slow the accumulation of federal regulations and force regular retrospective review, while aiming to hold down the aggregate cost of the regulatory state.

Definitions anchor the bill in existing administrative law. “Agency” and “rule” have the meanings in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 551, which generally covers both executive departments and independent regulatory commissions. “Major rule” follows the Congressional Review Act’s definition in 5 U.S.C. § 804—typically rules with an annual economic effect of $100 million or more or significant cost/price or competitiveness impacts. “State” is defined broadly to include states, D.C., U.S. territories, and federally recognized tribes, underscoring federalism and tribal considerations.

Section 3 imposes the core requirements:

- For any new rule, an agency may not issue it unless it has repealed three or more existing rules that were adopted through notice-and-comment under 5 U.S.C. § 553. The repealed rules, “to the extent practicable,” must be related to the new rule, limiting pure apples-for-oranges swaps while still providing agencies some flexibility.

- For any new major rule, there is an added fiscal guardrail: the total cost of the new major rule must be less than or equal to the combined costs of the three or more repealed rules. The Administrator of OIRA (within OMB) must certify this cost comparison. This embeds OIRA as the cost referee and formalizes a regulatory budgeting function in law.

- The bill explicitly excludes interpretative rules, general statements of policy, and agency organization/procedure/practice rules from being counted for repeal, and only permits repeal of rules that were originally adopted via notice-and-comment. In practical terms, agencies cannot meet the quota by tossing out nonbinding guidance or internal manuals; they must identify actual legislative rules to repeal, and those repeals must be published in the Federal Register.

- Applicability is confined to rules that “impose a cost or responsibility” on non-governmental persons or state/local governments. The Act does not apply to rules dealing solely with agency management, personnel, or procurement. Practically, this means deregulatory rules that reduce burdens (and so do not impose costs) would generally not trigger the three-for-one requirement; the constraints fall most squarely on new rules that add obligations or costs to the private sector or governments.

Section 4 directs the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to conduct an inventory and cost study: a baseline report one year after enactment and every five years thereafter, detailing the number of rules and major rules in effect and an estimate of the total economic cost they impose. This is intended to provide transparency and a data foundation for Congress and the public to assess regulatory accumulation and costs over time.

Key implications and operational issues:

- This bill would codify a stringent regulatory offset regime across the entire administrative state, including independent regulatory agencies. It is more rigid than prior executive guidance because it sets a fixed three-for-one ratio and a hard cost cap for major rules.

- Agencies seeking to issue a cost-imposing rule must find at least three notice-and-comment rules to repeal and justify those repeals under the APA’s “reasoned decisionmaking” standard. Repealing rules just to meet a quota could be vulnerable to litigation if the agency does not supply a substantive, record-based rationale that aligns with the underlying statutory mandates and considers reliance interests.

- The cost test for major rules looks only at costs, not net benefits. While OIRA historically emphasizes benefit-cost analysis under E.O. 12866 and related guidance, the statute would require major rules to be cost-offset even if their benefits far exceed their costs. That could force agencies to hunt for sufficiently “costly” old rules to repeal, and may necessitate retrospective cost estimation for older rules that lacked robust cost analyses at the time.

- The “relatedness” clause (“to the extent practicable”) aims to prevent gaming but also gives agencies discretion. How strictly OIRA or courts interpret “related” could determine how feasible compliance is across diverse regulatory programs.

- There are no explicit exceptions for emergency, court-ordered, or national security rules that impose costs. Agencies might therefore face delays in responding to urgent public health, environmental, or financial market risks while they identify and repeal three qualifying rules.

- Because only rules imposing costs are covered, deregulatory actions that remove obligations likely fall outside the Act’s constraints, potentially accelerating deregulatory agendas while slowing new protections.

Overall, the ERASER Act would significantly recalibrate the rulemaking landscape by binding agencies to a repeal quota and a cost ceiling for major rules, shifting OIRA further into a gatekeeping role, and providing periodic GAO-led accounting of the regulatory stock and its estimated cost. Advocates view it as a disciplined check on “red tape” growth; critics see it as a blunt instrument that could block needed protections and distort policy choices by prioritizing cost reduction over net social welfare and statutory missions.

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Where Each Party Stands

Democrats

MIGHT SUPPORT
+Forces systematic retrospective review that can clear genuinely outdated, duplicative, or conflicting rules and improve regulatory coherence.
+GAO’s recurring inventory and cost estimates add transparency that can inform smarter, targeted reforms rather than ad hoc deregulation.
+The “relatedness” qualifier for repealed rules reduces the risk of arbitrary, unrelated repeals simply to hit a quota.
+The requirement that repealed rules must have gone through notice-and-comment prevents easy gaming via scrapping mere guidance while leaving substantive burdens intact.
+OIRA certification could create a uniform analytic standard across agencies and highlight where better retrospective analysis is needed.
MIGHT OPPOSE
Uses an arbitrary three-for-one quota that ignores benefits and net welfare, risking the repeal of beneficial protections to enable new, needed rules.
The major rule cost cap considers costs only, not benefits; this could obstruct rules with very large net benefits (e.g., climate, health, and safety) if agencies cannot find sufficiently “costly” rules to offset.
No explicit emergency or court-ordered exception could delay urgent actions on public health crises, environmental disasters, cybersecurity, or financial stability.
Applies to independent agencies, potentially undermining their expert-driven mandates in areas like financial consumer protection, market integrity, or telecommunications.
Creates legal and administrative burdens: agencies must justify repeals under the APA and statutory missions, inviting litigation that can slow or block rules with strong public interest benefits.
Cost estimation is uncertain, especially for older rules; focusing on cost alone can bias decisions against equity, distributional considerations, and long-term climate or health impacts.
May conflict with congressional mandates directing agencies to issue specific protections within timelines, effectively setting a de facto regulatory ceiling not contemplated by underlying statutes.

Republicans

MIGHT SUPPORT
+Institutionalizes a strong check on regulatory growth, reducing red tape and cumulative compliance costs that can stifle entrepreneurship, small business formation, and innovation.
+Imposes a concrete offset requirement and a cost discipline on major rules, ensuring that new costly mandates are balanced by repealing older burdens.
+Promotes a culture of retrospective review, compelling agencies to scrutinize and retire obsolete or ineffective regulations that persist by inertia.
+Enhances accountability through OIRA certification and periodic GAO reports, providing clear metrics on the size and cost of the regulatory state.
+Focuses squarely on rules that impose costs or responsibilities on the private sector and state/local governments, aligning with federalism and competitiveness concerns.
+Builds on proven deregulatory approaches (e.g., the former two-for-one policy), but with stronger statutory teeth and broader coverage across agencies, including independents.
+Relatedness requirement helps keep offsets within comparable program areas, limiting superficial gaming while still affording agencies some flexibility.
MIGHT OPPOSE
The fixed three-for-one ratio may be overly rigid in some domains, forcing agencies to hunt for repeals even when legacy rules are already sparse or highly mandated by statute.
By excluding interpretive rules and policy statements from counting toward the quota, the bill may limit opportunities to remove impactful pseudo-regulatory guidance that businesses perceive as burdensome.
Administrative and litigation costs could increase as agencies defend repeals and cost estimates, potentially offsetting some efficiency gains.
Lack of explicit emergency or national security exceptions could slow time-sensitive actions and expose administrations to political risk if crises are mishandled pending offsets.
Cost estimation and OIRA certification can become bottlenecks, empowering technocratic gatekeeping and delaying deregulatory priorities if analytical capacity is limited or politicized.

History

Jan 08, 2025
Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Jan 08, 2025
Introduced in Senate
SPONSOR
Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]
Sen. Schmitt, Eric [R-MO]
MO · R
SUBJECTS
Administrative law and regulatory procedures Congressional oversight Government studies and investigations