Protect Our Seniors Act

Taken together, these provisions are designed to accomplish two goals: prevent direct benefit cuts to seniors’ core federal programs, and create a “lockbox” effect so that when lawmakers find savings in Medicare, those savings are not repurposed for non-Medicare priorities. The bill applies only to Senate procedure; the House is not bound by these points of order. Nevertheless, because most major legislation must pass both chambers, a Senate rule of this kind would significantly shape what can be enacted.

Operationally, enforcement would depend on Congressional Budget Office (CBO) scoring and the Senate parliamentarian’s interpretation. For the first point of order, the core question would be whether a provision reduces benefits under Title II (Social Security) or Medicare. For the second, CBO would identify whether the bill’s overall budgetary effects rely on Medicare savings or revenue increases to finance costs in other, non-Medicare parts of the bill. This could affect large packages that combine Medicare reforms with broader health or fiscal changes; even if the overall package reduces the deficit, the rule would likely still apply if Medicare savings are offsetting costs elsewhere in the bill.

The implications are substantial for future budget deals and reconciliation bills. Reconciliation often includes changes to entitlement programs and offsets that allow a package to meet budget targets. Under S. 36, inserting any benefit-reducing entitlement reforms for Social Security or Medicare would face a 67‑vote hurdle, even in reconciliation. Similarly, using Medicare pay‑fors—like cuts to overpayments, site-neutral payment reforms, or pharmaceutical savings—to fund unrelated spending or tax changes would be procedurally blocked unless two‑thirds of Senators agreed to waive the rule. Lawmakers could still enact Medicare savings, but those savings would have to be dedicated to Medicare itself (for example, to extend the Hospital Insurance trust fund or add new Medicare benefits such as dental or vision) or left to reduce deficits without being paired with unrelated new costs.

The bill leaves wide latitude for non-benefit-side solvency measures for Social Security—such as increasing payroll tax rates or raising the taxable wage cap—since the restriction is on cutting benefits, not increasing revenue. For Medicare, it preserves the ability to pursue efficiencies and savings so long as they are not used to offset other policy costs outside Medicare. The language “for the purpose of carrying out those programs” will require case-by-case interpretation; drafters may attempt to characterize certain health initiatives as Medicare-related to avoid the point of order, and the parliamentarian would referee those claims.

Politically, S. 36 positions its sponsor and supporters as defenders of seniors, while also reviving a long-running “trust fund lockbox” idea that both parties have embraced at times. Supporters will see it as a guardrail against benefit cuts and against using Medicare as a pay‑for for unrelated agendas. Critics will argue it constrains comprehensive fiscal negotiations and makes difficult but potentially necessary entitlement reforms even harder by requiring a supermajority. The bill does not change benefit law directly, but by changing the procedural landscape in the Senate, it would meaningfully shape what kinds of Social Security and Medicare legislation can realistically move forward.