SOPRA

Bill Summary

The Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2025 (SOPRA) is a targeted amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), specifically to 5 U.S.C. § 706, which governs the scope of judicial review of federal agency actions. Its central move is to require federal courts to decide de novo—that is, independently and without deference—“all relevant questions of law,” including the meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions, agency-made rules (regulations), and even interpretive rules, policy statements, and other guidance documents. In plainer terms, when an agency action is challenged in court, judges must determine the correct legal interpretation themselves rather than giving weight to the agency’s own reading of the law or its regulations.

The bill accomplishes this by inserting explicit de novo language into § 706 and by broadening its coverage. It specifies that, notwithstanding any other law, this de novo standard applies to any judicial review of agency action authorized under any statute. It also bars implied exemptions: no law can exempt a civil action from this de novo requirement unless that law explicitly references § 706 and creates a specific carve-out. The bill’s structural edits are largely re-numbering the subsections to accommodate the new de novo clause.

What SOPRA does not do is equally important. It does not eliminate agencies, their rulemaking powers, or the APA’s other review standards for facts and policymaking. The traditional “substantial evidence” test for agency fact-finding and the “arbitrary and capricious” standard for policy judgments remain intact. SOPRA is focused on questions of law: when the issue is what a statute or regulation means, courts cannot defer to an agency’s interpretation simply because the statute or regulation is ambiguous or because the agency claims expertise. SOPRA therefore aims to codify and extend the recent judicial trend that has already curtailed or ended deference doctrines like Chevron (deference to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous statutes) and Auer/Seminole Rock (deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own regulations). It also reaches agency interpretations expressed in informal guidance and policy statements, signaling that such materials carry no special weight in court on legal meaning.

Practically, SOPRA would likely have several effects. First, it would strengthen the judiciary’s role as the final arbiter of legal meaning in administrative cases, reducing agencies’ ability to resolve ambiguities in their favor. Second, it could increase litigation volume and duration, as challengers would have stronger incentives to contest agency legal interpretations and agencies would have fewer procedural advantages in defending them. Third, it might produce more short-term uncertainty and more frequent circuit splits, since different courts may initially diverge on statutory meaning without a unifying deference doctrine, pushing more cases toward Supreme Court resolution. Over time, however, clearer judicial precedents could stabilize expectations.

Agencies would likely respond by grounding rules more explicitly in statutory text, building more detailed legal analyses into rulemaking records, and relying less on broadly framed guidance documents as quasi-regulatory tools. Congress, in turn, may face pressure to legislate more precisely when delegating authority, because courts applying de novo review will not fill gaps by defaulting to agency views. Regulated parties—businesses, states, and advocacy groups—could find it easier to win legal challenges where statutory text is contested. The flip side is that administrations of any party—whether pursuing regulation or deregulation—will face tighter judicial scrutiny when they rely on aggressive readings of old statutes to address novel problems.

Politically, the bill reflects long-standing conservative critiques of the “administrative state,” asserting that separation of powers requires judges, not agencies, to say what the law means. Supporters frame SOPRA as restoring constitutional balance and democratic accountability to elected lawmakers and independent courts. Critics worry that removing deference diminishes the role of expert agencies, politicizes legal interpretation, and could undercut the federal government’s capacity to implement complex policies—especially in fast-moving areas like public health, environmental protection, and financial regulation. Because SOPRA sets a cross-cutting default rule that can only be displaced by explicit statute, it would be a durable shift in administrative law unless Congress enacts targeted exceptions with the required specificity.

In summary, SOPRA is a structural recalibration of administrative law: it does not change how courts review agency facts or policy choices per se, but it mandates independent judicial judgment on all legal questions, broadly and by default. That shift would constrain agency interpretive discretion, invite more judicial engagement, and likely reshape how both agencies and Congress approach the design, defense, and implementation of federal regulatory programs.

Pros

May encourage Congress to write clearer, more specific statutes, reducing reliance on agencies to fill large policy gaps and improving democratic accountability to elected lawmakers.
Provides a more robust judicial check against politically motivated or abusive agency interpretations that could harm workers, consumers, or marginalized communities—especially under administrations seeking to roll back protections by reinterpreting statutes.
Could reduce policy whiplash driven by shifting agency interpretations across administrations once courts settle statutory meaning, creating longer-term stability for certain programs.
Clarifies that informal guidance and policy statements cannot be treated as de facto binding law, reinforcing due process and notice-and-comment safeguards that progressives often support.
Aligns with recent Supreme Court direction, offering clarity and uniformity for litigants and lower courts about the governing standard of review.

Reasserts separation of powers by ensuring courts, not agencies, have the final say on legal interpretation, curbing what critics see as lawmaking by the administrative state.
Effectively ends Chevron- and Auer-type deference across the board and by statute, preventing future courts or agencies from reviving them absent explicit congressional direction.
Discourages agencies from using “regulatory dark matter” (guidance, policy statements) to steer industry without going through formal rulemaking, reinforcing transparency and accountability.
Promotes clearer, tighter statutory drafting by Congress, reducing strategic ambiguity that agencies could exploit to expand their jurisdiction.
Empowers states, small businesses, and regulated entities to challenge overreaching regulations on legal grounds, likely improving cost-benefit rigor and limiting mission creep.
The “notwithstanding” and explicit-reference clauses prevent backdoor carve-outs, creating a uniform, predictable default rule for all agency-review statutes.

Cons

Undercuts the practical ability of expert agencies to implement complex statutes (environmental, labor, healthcare, consumer finance) by denying weight to their technical judgments on legal meaning.
Risks increased politicization and fragmentation of legal outcomes as generalist judges without subject-matter expertise substitute their views for those of specialized agencies; invites forum shopping and circuit splits.
Likely increases litigation volume, costs, and delays, which can chill ambitious regulatory initiatives and slow government responses to urgent problems like pandemics, climate risks, or financial crises.
Destabilizes reliance interests built under settled agency interpretations, threatening ongoing investments, compliance programs, and protections that communities and industries have planned around.
Shifts power from politically accountable executive officials to life-tenured judges, potentially enabling judicial activism to block progressive policies even where Congress has broadly delegated authority.

Short- to medium-term uncertainty and litigation spikes may burden businesses with legal costs and unpredictable compliance obligations due to divergent circuit interpretations.
Consolidates significant power in the federal judiciary; if courts are unsympathetic to deregulatory readings, conservative administrations could find their own legal interpretations struck down.
May slow deregulatory efforts that also rely on aggressive statutory interpretations to unwind prior rules, subjecting them to the same de novo skepticism.
Could produce more frequent circuit splits and a heavier Supreme Court docket, delaying nationwide clarity and complicating national compliance strategies for multi-state businesses.

This bill was introduced on January 08, 2025 in the Senate.

View on Congress.gov:
https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/senate-bill/33

Jan 08, 2025

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.
Jan 08, 2025

Introduced in Senate

10000

This bill has not yet been enacted into law.

Bill Summary

Pros

Cons

Introduction

History

Read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

Introduced in Senate

Laws Enacted

Related Bills