House 2186 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore the limitation on downward attribution of stock ownership in applying constructive ownership rules.

To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to restore the limitation on downward attribution of stock ownership in applying constructive ownership rules.

Bill Summary

What the bill does, in plain terms: It rewrites part of the international tax rules to undo a 2017 change that unexpectedly swept many foreign corporations into the “controlled foreign corporation” (CFC) regime through what’s called downward attribution. At the same time, it installs a narrower, more targeted backstop so that U.S. subsidiaries that are effectively controlled by a foreign parent can still be required to pick up Subpart F and GILTI income when they are, in substance, in control of a foreign affiliate.

How the current law got here: Before 2017, the tax code blocked “downward attribution” from a foreign person to a U.S. person when determining whether a foreign company was a CFC and who counted as a “U.S. shareholder.” That rule lived in section 958(b)(4). The 2017 tax law (TCJA) repealed that limitation. As a result, when a foreign parent owned both a U.S. subsidiary and a foreign subsidiary, the U.S. subsidiary could be treated as constructively owning the foreign subsidiary’s stock—even if it had no actual ownership—making the foreign subsidiary a CFC. That triggered Subpart F and GILTI inclusions and extensive reporting for many U.S. companies that didn’t truly control those foreign corporations, producing compliance burdens and “phantom income” issues.

What this bill changes:

Pros

  • Fixes an acknowledged TCJA problem that created CFC status and tax inclusions for U.S. companies with no real economic ownership, reducing administrative burdens without rewarding avoidance.
  • Adds a targeted backstop (section 951B) so that anti-deferral rules like Subpart F and GILTI still apply where a U.S. entity is effectively in majority control, protecting the U.S. tax base.
  • Focuses enforcement where control truly exists (more than 50%), rather than sweeping in incidental 10% holdings, aligning rules with substance-over-form principles.
  • Grants Treasury regulatory authority to close loopholes and coordinate with other international provisions, strengthening anti-avoidance capacity.
  • Offers clearer, more predictable rules, which improves compliance and enables the IRS to allocate resources to higher-risk cases of base erosion and profit shifting.
  • Restores the pre-2017 limitation on downward attribution and corrects a widely acknowledged TCJA drafting problem that caused “phantom CFCs” and expensive, unnecessary compliance for U.S. businesses.
  • Reduces barriers for inbound investment by eliminating unintended Subpart F/GILTI inclusions for U.S. subsidiaries of foreign multinationals that don’t truly own foreign affiliates.
  • Targets anti-abuse with a narrower, majority-control standard (over 50%) rather than a sweeping 10% threshold, striking a pro-growth balance between competitiveness and base protection.
  • Provides certainty and simplifies life for many taxpayers and practitioners by reversing an overbroad rule that generated Forms 5471, GILTI calculations, and E&P tracking for entities with no real control.
  • Bipartisan framing improves prospects for durable policy, reducing the risk of frequent rule changes that undermine planning and investment.

Cons

  • Raising the threshold to “more than 50 percent” could invite planning to keep ownership at or below 50%, potentially allowing income shifting to avoid GILTI and Subpart F relative to current law.
  • Overall revenue may decline compared with the post-2017 regime, potentially undermining international tax reform goals unless Treasury’s anti-avoidance rules are robust.
  • Creating a parallel foreign-controlled regime adds complexity and may create new gray areas, which sophisticated taxpayers could exploit.
  • The broad regulatory delegation is necessary but could be inconsistently applied over time; some Democrats may prefer clearer statutory anti-abuse rules and guardrails.
  • The effective-date design and transition could allow some taxpayers to time transactions, and the “no inference” clause may frustrate efforts to litigate aggressive past positions.
  • The new section 951B reimposes Subpart F/GILTI exposure on foreign-parented groups in certain cases, which some will see as an unnecessary new layer instead of a clean rollback.
  • Treasury’s broad authority to extend these concepts to other parts of the Code could recreate complexity and uncertainty through regulation rather than statute.
  • Maintaining a dual-track regime (traditional CFC rules plus the new foreign-controlled regime) keeps compliance costs elevated and may complicate guidance and audits.
  • The more-than-50% threshold still requires intricate constructive ownership analyses and could lead to disputes over control, limiting the hoped-for simplification.
  • Transition timing and partial retroactivity to fiscal years may create short-term planning and systems burdens for businesses and tax administrators.

This bill was introduced on March 18, 2025 in the House.

View on Congress.gov:
https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2186

  • Referred to the House Committee on Ways and Means.

    H11100

  • Introduced in House

    Intro-H

  • Introduced in House

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This bill has not yet been enacted into law.

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Policy Area: Taxation